OS.1 – Synrc Operating System ============================= * [1]. Threat Model * [2]. Architectural Principles * [3]. Planes * [4]. Component Catalog * [5]. Communication & Capability Model * [6]. Example Deployments * [7]. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 Attestation * [8]. Gaps & Operational Requirements * [9]. Glossary & References ## 1. Threat Model OS.1 is a minimal, high-assurance operating system designed for regulated, sovereign, and high-security environments. It optimises for: * Absolute isolation of long-term cryptographic material * Capability-based authority (no ambient authority) * Formal auditability and non-repudiation * Small, inspectable TCB * Erlang/OTP supervision and hot upgrade semantics Threat model and hardening posture: * Compromised application code or libraries - Application Plane is fully sandboxed (namespaces + cgroups + seccomp + landlock). - No long-term secrets ever reach it. * Network-facing service compromise - Only Control Plane has network. - Security Plane has zero sockets. * Privilege escalation (Application → Control or Control → Security) - Capability broker + sealed Unix socket + ABAC - No ambient authority. * Long-term private key extraction - Keys live only in Security Plane (or external HSM). - Never leave. * Unauthorised device or mount access - Control Plane is sole owner of devices/mounts. - Granted only via SCM_RIGHTS after ABAC decision. * Supply-chain injection of unsigned components - UKI + signed OTP releases + SBOM + [S] signatures. * Physical attacks on the host - Discrete TPM (not fTPM) preferred; firmware measured at boot. - Full-disk encryption with keys sealed to PCR state (TPM). - Chassis intrusion detection fed into early-boot PCR extend. - External ports (USB, Thunderbolt, etc.) disabled or gated by physical presence + Control Plane policy. - Security Plane can run on a separate physical board / PCIe card with its own TPM when threat model requires it. * Side-channel attacks on the CPU - Security Plane pinned to isolated core(s); SMT/hyperthreading disabled on those cores. - Constant-time implementations mandatory for all crypto in [S]. - Memory encryption (TME/SME or equivalent) enabled when hardware supports it. - No shared page cache or huge pages between Security Plane and any other plane. * Compromised TPM / HSM firmware - Dual-root design: primary TPM + optional external HSM. - TPM firmware measurement and remote attestation of the TPM itself. - Critical CA operations require threshold / multi-party approval (m-of-n) before the Security Plane will sign. - Offline root key ceremony; online Security Plane holds only intermediate keys when possible. - Continuous PCR monitoring + external attestation service. * Social engineering of operators - No single operator can extract or use long-term keys. - Sensitive operations (root CA, key export, policy change) require dual control (two independent authenticated operators). - Operator authentication is hardware-backed (FIDO2 / smartcard + PIN) and bound to the Control Plane session. - Break-glass procedures exist but are heavily audited and time- delayed; they cannot bypass the Security Plane socket policy. - All operator actions are signed and append-only logged. ## 2. Architectural Principles * Three mutually distrusting planes with strict privilege separation * Security Plane owns every long-term secret; never touches the network * Control Plane is the sole capability broker and kernel operator * Application Plane is completely untrusted and heavily sandboxed * All inter-plane communication is explicit, capability-mediated, and audited * Hardware root of trust (TPM 2.0) + UKI + Landlock + namespaces + cgroups + seccomp * Base OS layer is Alpine/Chimera compatible (musl + BSD userland) * C99 components are integrated into the BEAM as NIFs * Runtime unit is an Erlang BEAM (can run as VM, OCI container, or pod) ## 3. Planes ### Runtime model Each plane runs as one or more Erlang BEAM instances. These BEAMs may be placed in a VM, an OCI container, or a pod. C99 system components are compiled as NIFs and loaded into the appropriate BEAM. The underlying OS is Alpine/Chimera-based. ### Boot / attestation flow TPM 2.0 → Secure Boot (Limine / EDK2) → Unified Kernel Image (UKI) * Operating System (zero) * Security Admin BEAM (first) * System Admin BEAM (second) * Application BEAM per seat / domain ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ System Plane C99 (Trusted Operating System) │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ tpm2 - bitedits/tpm2 - Secure Boot │ │ limine - bitedits/limine - Limine Bootloader │ │ edk2 - bitedits/edk2 - TianoCore EDK II │ │ rootfs - bitedits/rootfs - Unified Kernel Image (UKI) Construction │ │ musl - bitedits/musl - C Library │ │ bsdutils - bitedits/bsdutils - Berkeley Userland │ │ toybox - bitedits/toybox - POSIX Engine │ │ acpi - bitedits/acpi - Power Tools │ │ chrony - bitedits/chrony - Time Server │ │ apk - bitedits/apk - Package Management │ │ audit - bitedits/audit - Auditing Userspace │ │ bpftrace - bitedits/bpftrace - eBPF System Observability │ │ nftables - bitedits/nftables - Network Firewall │ │ landlock - bitedits/landlock - Mandatory Access Control │ │ openrc - bitedits/openrc - Init Supervisor │ │ doas - bitedits/doas - User Privileges │ │ seat - bitedits/seat - Seat Devices │ │ ctwm - bitedits/ctwm - Window Manager │ │ gstreamer - bitedits/gstreamer - GStreamer │ │ erlang - bitedits/erlang - Ericsson Erlang │ │ elixir - bitedits/elixir - Platformatec Business DSL │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Security Admin BEAM (Trusted Security Services) │ │ │ │ * Highest privilege, absolute minimal surface │ │ * Owns all long-term keys, HSM/TPM, root & intermediate CAs │ │ * Never opens network sockets, devices (except TPM/HSM), or mounts │ │ * Communicates exclusively with Control Plane over one sealed, │ │ capability-limited, length-prefixed Unix-domain socket │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ tss - synrc/tss - TSS2 TPM 2.0 / hardware crypto / attestation │ │ kvs - synrc/kvs - sealed key & certificate storage only │ │ ca - synrc/ca - certificate authority (root + intermediates) │ │ cm - synrc/cm - configuration database │ │ au - synrc/au - high-assurance audit logging (signing keys) │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ System Admin BEAM (privileged control plane) │ │ │ │ * Sole owner of kernel operations, devices, seats, mounts, network config │ │ * Capability broker (open → ioctl → SCM_RIGHTS) │ │ * Requests all cryptographic operations from Security Admin BEAM │ │ * Never holds long-term private keys │ │ * Never opens graphical displays or loads untrusted application code │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ os - synrc/os - core system services, power, time, audit │ │ cd - erpuno/cd - cluster, names, storage mounts │ │ seat - bitedits/seat - seatd + device capability grants │ │ land - bitedits/land - Landlock profile enforcement │ │ net - bitedits/net - nftables, routing, firewall │ │ vpn - zencrypted/vpn - tunnelling │ │ mqtt - erpuno/mqtt - broker │ │ turn - erpuno/turn - STUN/TURN streaming │ │ rest - synrc/rest - HTTP API │ │ asn1 - synrc/asn1 - ASN.1 │ │ rpc - synrc/rpc - BERT │ │ x422 - zencrypted/x422- X.422 protocol │ │ ias - zencrypted/ias - identity & authentication (uses TSS) │ │ ldap - synrc/ldap - directory (uses TSS) │ │ abac - erpuno/abac - attribute-based access control (uses TSS) │ │ kvs - synrc/kvs - privileged volume & CAS storage │ │ bridge - synrc/bridge - authenticated channels to Application BEAMs │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Application BEAM(s) (unprivileged session / domain) │ │ │ │ * Receive only short-lived keys & certificates via capability grants │ │ * Host X11, window manager, media, and all business logic │ │ * Communicate only through the Control Plane bridge │ │ * Subject to full namespaces + cgroups + seccomp + Landlock │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ x11 - bitedits/x11 - rootless Xorg / Xwayland / Port │ │ wm - bitedits/wm - ctwm + OTP window-manager components │ │ mad - synrc/mad - Synrc Erlang Package Manager │ │ pie - 5HT/pie - Pie Editor in Erlang │ │ fs - synrc/fs - file-system event listener │ │ gst - zencrypted/gst - GStreamer / PipeWire pipelines │ │ rtp - zencrypted/rtp - real-time media (WebRTC) │ │ chat - synrc/chat - instant messenger │ │ bpmn - synrc/bpmn - business process management │ │ form - synrc/form - form management │ │ n2o - synrc/n2o - web-telecom framework │ │ nitro - synrc/nitro - declarative web framework │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ## 4. Component Catalog (See the three-plane diagrams above. All listed repositories are owned by the author. The lists are exhaustive for the current design.) ## 5. Communication & Capability Model * Security <> Control. Single sealed, capability-limited, length-prefixed Unix-domain socket. Security Plane never initiates connections. Control Plane may request cryptographic operations (sign, decrypt, attest, issue short-lived cert). No other channels exist. * Control <> Application. Authenticated bridge service (synrc/bridge). Application BEAMs receive only short-lived keys and certificates. Device, mount, and network capabilities are granted via SCM_RIGHTS after ABAC decision. No direct kernel or device access is possible. All capability grants and cryptographic operations are audited (append-only, HMAC + signature by Security Plane). ## 6. Example Deployments ### Example 1. Chat Messenger ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ ERP.1 Chat Messenger BEAM (v2) (chat-messenger) pod │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ asn1 - synrc/asn1 - Synrc ASN.1 Compiler │ │ ns - synrc/ns - DNSSEC name server │ │ ca - synrc/ca - certificate authority │ │ au - synrc/au - high-assurance audit logging (signing keys) │ │ ias - zencrypted/ias - identity and authentication services │ │ ldap - synrc/ldap - certificates, policy, auth, directory (aggreg.) │ │ abac - erpuno/abac - attribute based access control (aggregate) │ │ chat - synrc/chat - instant messenger │ │ rtp - zencrypted/rtp - real time processing (WebRTC) │ │ gst - zencrypted/gst - GStreamer / PipeWire pipelines │ │ bpmn - synrc/bpmn - business process management notation │ │ mqtt - erpuno/mqtt - brokering │ │ turn - erpuno/turn - streaming (STUN/TURN) │ │ form - synrc/form - form management │ │ n2o - synrc/n2o - web-telecom framework, cache, session, ws ping │ │ nitro - synrc/nitro - declarative web framework │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ### Example 2. Document Management System ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ ERP.1 Document Management System BEAM (v3) (dms-documents) pod │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ crm - erpuno/crm - document management system │ │ docx - erpuno/docx - OpenXML template processor │ │ katottg - erpuno/katottg - Ukrainian Locations Index │ │ soa - erpuno/soa - X-ROAD Trembita SOAP library │ │ sevovv - erpuno/sevovv - Ukrainian Governmental Mail Exchange Service Bus │ │ erp - erpuno/schema - ERP.1 unified enterprise schema (HL7 coverage) │ │ acc - erpuno/acc - ERP.1 unified account employee HCM │ │ ocr - erpuno/ocr - Tesseract based OCR │ │ scan - erpuno/scan - HTML5 based client and F# web server │ │ abac - erpuno/abac - attribute base access control (local copy) │ │ ca - synrc/ca - certificate authority │ │ au - synrc/au - high-assurance audit logging (signing keys) │ │ chat - synrc/chat - instant messenger │ │ bpmn - synrc/bpmn - business process management notation │ │ form - synrc/form - form management │ │ n2o - synrc/n2o - web-telecom framework, cache, session, ws ping │ │ nitro - synrc/nitro - declarative web framework │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ### Example 3. Infosec Utilities ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Infosec BEAM (isolated sandbox services) │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ rt - bitedits/rt - NuttX POSIX RTOS │ │ skynet - bitedits/skynet - Drone Swarm Control Plane X.422.1 │ │ be - bitedits/be - Binary Editor with Disassemblers │ │ tv - bitedits/tv - Terminal Vision Text Editor in C99 │ │ sh - bitedits/sh - Formal POSIX shell │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ## 7. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 Attestation Security Plane = Security Admin BEAM (tss, ca, au, sealed kvs) Control Plane = System Admin BEAM (os, seat, net, abac, ias ...) Application Plane = Application BEAM (domain + session workloads) Legend: [S] Security Admin BEAM [C] System Admin BEAM [A] Application BEAM [K] Kernel / UKI / Landlock / cgroups (outer boundary) [+] Fully attested by architecture [~] Partially attested (requires operational procedure) [-] Not addressed by BEAM taxonomy alone ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ACCESS CONTROL (AC) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AC-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] documented in CMDB AC-2 Account Management ....................... [+] [C] ias + abac AC-3 Access Enforcement ....................... [+] [C] abac + Landlock [K] AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement ............. [+] [S]->[C]->[A] capability AC-5 Separation of Duties ..................... [+] three distinct planes AC-6 Least Privilege .......................... [+] [S] minimal TCB, [C] + [A] AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts .............. [+] [C] ias AC-8 System Use Notification .................. [~] [A] session banner AC-14 Permitted Actions w/o Identification ..... [+] none (mTLS mandatory) AC-17 Remote Access ............................ [+] [C] vpn + mTLS AC-18 Wireless Access .......................... [+] [C] net (nftables drop) AC-19 Access Control for Mobile ................ [+] [C] device grants only AC-20 Use of External Systems .................. [+] [C] capability broker AC-21 Information Sharing ...................... [+] [C] abac attributes AC-22 Publicly Accessible Content .............. [+] none by default AC-24 Access Control Decisions ................. [+] [C] abac (uses [S]) AC-25 Reference Monitor ........................ [+] [C] + [K] Landlock/seccomp ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (AU) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AU-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB + itsm AU-2 Event Logging ............................ [+] [C] ias -> kvs AU-3 Content of Audit Records ................. [+] [C] full context + HMAC AU-4 Audit Log Storage Capacity ............... [~] [C] kvs sizing policy AU-5 Response to Audit Logging Process Failures [+] fail-secure (operation aborts) AU-6 Audit Record Review, Analysis, Reporting . [+] [C] -> SIEM (Wazuh) AU-7 Audit Record Reduction and Report Gen. ... [+] [C] ias reports AU-8 Time Stamps .............................. [+] [C] os_time (Chrony) AU-9 Protection of Audit Information .......... [+] [C] kvs append-only + Kupyna AU-10 Non-repudiation .......................... [+] [S] TSA + [C] signed events AU-11 Audit Record Retention ................... [~] operational policy AU-12 Audit Record Generation .................. [+] [C] real-time, fail-secure ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ASSESSMENT, AUTHORIZATION, AND MONITORING (CA) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CA-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB CA-2 Control Assessments ...................... [+] synrc/ca TeX generation CA-3 Information Exchange ..................... [+] [C] mTLS + capability CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) .... [~] itsm tracking CA-6 Authorization ............................ [+] L3 profile signed by [S] CA-7 Continuous Monitoring .................... [+] Wazuh + Zabbix + CMDB CA-8 Penetration Testing ...................... [~] annual, external CA-9 Internal System Connections .............. [+] [C] mTLS only ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT (CM) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CM-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB as code CM-2 Baseline Configuration ................... [+] [C] Elixir CMDB modules CM-3 Configuration Change Control ............. [+] Git + signed releases CM-4 Impact Analyses .......................... [~] process CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change ........... [+] [C] privileged only CM-6 Configuration Settings ................... [+] hardened baselines CM-7 Least Functionality ...................... [+] OTP releases only (R3) CM-8 System Component Inventory ............... [+] [C] CMDB hw.ex/sys.ex CM-9 Configuration Management Plan ............. [+] Git + CI + CMDB CM-10 Software Usage Restrictions .............. [+] signed OTP only CM-11 User-Installed Software .................. [+] rejected by loader CM-14 Signed Components ........................ [+] [S] ca signatures ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONTINGENCY PLANNING (CP) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CP-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] documented CP-2 Contingency Plan ......................... [+] OTP supervision trees CP-3 Contingency Training ..................... [~] operational CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing ................. [~] operational CP-7 Alternate Processing Site ................ [+] [C] cluster (cd) CP-8 Telecommunications Services .............. [+] [C] vpn + mqtt CP-9 System Backup ............................ [+] [C] kvs replication CP-10 System Recovery and Reconstitution ....... [+] hot code upgrade + restart ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (IA) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- IA-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB IA-2 Identification and Authentication ........ [+] [C] ias MFA (cert + OTP) IA-3 Device Identification and Authentication . [+] [C] seat + [S] TPM quotes IA-4 Identifier Management .................... [+] [C] ias IA-5 Authenticator Management ................. [+] [S] ca + HSM IA-6 Authenticator Feedback ................... [+] [C] ias IA-7 Cryptographic Module Authentication ...... [+] [S] tss (FIPS/HSM) IA-8 Identification and Authentication (Non-Org)[+] [C] federation (SAML/OIDC) IA-11 Re-authentication ........................ [+] [C] ias session policy IA-12 Identity Proofing ........................ [~] process + [S] ca ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MEDIA PROTECTION (MP) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MP-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB MP-2 Media Access ............................. [+] [C] kvs + Landlock MP-3 Media Marking ............................ [~] operational MP-4 Media Storage ............................ [+] [C] encrypted kvs MP-5 Media Transport .......................... [+] [C] encrypted backups MP-6 Media Sanitization ....................... [~] procedure MP-7 Media Use ................................ [+] [K] USB blocked by default ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (PE) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PE-1 .. PE-9, PE-11 .. PE-18 ................... [~] facility controls ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PLANNING (PL) / PROGRAM MANAGEMENT (PM) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PL-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB + L1/L2/L3 profiles PL-2 System Security and Privacy Plans ........ [+] generated from CMDB PL-4 Rules of Behavior ........................ [~] organizational PL-8 Security and Privacy Architectures ....... [+] three-plane taxonomy PM-1 .. PM-32 (selected) ....................... [~] organizational / CMDB ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RISK ASSESSMENT (RA) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RA-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB RA-2 Security Categorization .................. [+] L1/L2/L3 profiles RA-3 Risk Assessment .......................... [+] CMDB risk.ex RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning .... [+] Wazuh + CI SBOM RA-7 Risk Response ............................ [~] POA&M via itsm ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION (SA) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SA-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB SA-3 System Development Life Cycle ............ [+] signed OTP + Git SA-4 Acquisition Process ...................... [~] process SA-8 Security and Privacy Engineering ......... [+] least privilege planes SA-10 Developer Configuration Management ....... [+] Git + signed releases SA-11 Developer Testing and Evaluation ......... [+] CI + attestation SA-12 Supply Chain Protection .................. [+] SBOM + [S] signatures SA-15 Development Process, Standards, Tools .... [+] Elixir/OTP + CMDB SA-17 Developer Security Architecture .......... [+] documented taxonomy ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION (SC) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SC-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB SC-2 Separation of System / User Functionality [+] [C] vs [A] SC-3 Security Function Isolation .............. [+] [S] pure crypto plane SC-4 Information in Shared Resources .......... [+] no ambient sharing SC-5 Denial-of-Service Protection ............. [+] [C] net + cgroups SC-7 Boundary Protection ...................... [+] [C] nftables + vpn SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality/Integrity ... [+] mTLS 1.3 + DSTU SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment/Mgmt ..... [+] [S] ca + tss/HSM SC-13 Cryptographic Protection ................. [+] [S] + [C] short-lived SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates ... [+] [S] ca SC-20 / SC-21 / SC-22 (DNS/PKI) ................ [+] [C] ns + [S] ca SC-23 Session Authenticity ..................... [+] [C] ias + mTLS SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest ........ [+] [C] kvs + Kalyna SC-39 Process Isolation ........................ [+] BEAM + [K] namespaces SC-45 System Time Synchronization .............. [+] [C] os_time (Chrony) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY (SI) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SI-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB SI-2 Flaw Remediation ......................... [+] signed hot upgrades SI-3 Malicious Code Protection ................ [+] Wazuh HIDS + SBOM SI-4 System Monitoring ........................ [+] Wazuh + Zabbix SI-7 Software, Firmware, Information Integrity [+] UKI + [S] signatures SI-10 Information Input Validation ............. [+] [A] schema validation SI-16 Memory Protection ........................ [+] BEAM + [K] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT (SR) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SR-1 Policy and Procedures .................... [+] CMDB SR-2 Supply Chain Risk Management Plan ........ [+] documented SR-3 Supply Chain Controls and Processes ...... [+] open-source + SBOM SR-4 Provenance ............................... [+] [S] signatures + CMDB SR-5 Acquisition Strategies ................... [~] process SR-6 Supplier Assessments and Reviews ......... [~] process SR-11 Component Authenticity ................... [+] [S] + serial CMDB ### SUMMARY Total base controls examined ................... [~110] Fully attested by architecture [+] ............. [~85] Partially attested / process-dependent [~] ..... [~20] Outside pure BEAM taxonomy [-/PE] .............. [~5] Strongest families : AC, IA, SC, CM, AU, SI, SR Requires operational closure : CP testing, PE, some RA/SA process controls Attestation generated from OS.1 taxonomy (Security Admin BEAM / System Admin BEAM / Application BEAM) against NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5 base controls. ## 8. Gaps & Operational Requirements Items marked [~] require organisational process, not pure architecture: * Contingency training and testing (CP-3, CP-4) * Physical / environmental controls (PE family) * Some media handling procedures (MP-3, MP-6) * Impact analysis and acquisition process formality (CM-4, SA-4, SR-5/6) * Identity proofing workflow (IA-12) * Audit retention policy and log sizing (AU-4, AU-11) * Annual external penetration testing (CA-8) These are deliberately left to the operator. The architecture itself does not claim to solve them. ## 9. Glossary & References BEAM Erlang virtual machine NIF Native Implemented Function (C99 inside BEAM) UKI Unified Kernel Image Landlock Linux mandatory access control (unprivileged) SCM_RIGHTS Unix credential / file-descriptor passing TSS TPM Software Stack ABAC Attribute-Based Access Control IAS Identity & Authentication Service CMDB Configuration Management Database (Elixir modules) Kupyna/Kalyna Ukrainian national cryptographic standards DSTU Ukrainian national standards Copyrigh (c) Cryptographic Telesystems, LLC. All repositories owned by the author.